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All is ephemeral - fame and the famous as well.
- Marcus Aurelius (A.D 12 1-180), Meditations IV
In the future everyone will be world-famous for fifteen
minutes.
-Andy Warhol (A.D. 1928-1987)
In the highly lauded 2003 Golden Globe® and
Academy Award® winner for best motion-picture, Chicago
protagonist Roxie Hart croons, "I'm gonna be a celebrity -
that means somebody everyone knows."' Although the film
pointedly parodies the fame-obsessed society of the 1920s,
it resonates with today's film audiences largely because the
desire for media attention is ubiquitous in contemporary
America. Ms. Hart's dreams of celebrity have come to fruition
for many ordinary people via their participation in reality
television shows. Over the past decade, and in the past year
especially, television airwaves have become flooded with a
variety of reality programming. In the 2002-2003 season, a
record twenty-five non-scripted series aired on the broadcast
networks; statistics regarding the number of series that
debuted in the summer of 2003 range from seventeen to
over thirty; and the 2003-2004 season boasts at least six
new reality television programs on the broadcast networks
alone.'
Although the list is constantly expanding, what
follows is a sampling of primetime offerings. Survivorand The
Amazing Race feature psychological competitions held in
exotic locales.4 American Idol, Fame, and Star Search follow
Hollywood hopefuls in their quest for a "big break."' The
Bachelor, The Bachelorette, Who Wants to Marry My Dad, For
Love or Money, and Joe Millionaire offer the chance for true
love and potential marriage. 6 Who Wants to Marry a
Multimillionaire and Married byAmerica culminate with the
betrothal of complete strangers.' The Surreal Life, Celebrity
Mole, and I'm a Celebrity: Get Me Out of Here! feature B-list
celebrities in reality television situations. Are You Hot places
half-naked twenty-somethings in the limelight, where their
egos are validated or vilified by celebrity judges.' Temptation
Island and Paradise Hotel place half-naked twenty-somethings
in a tropical setting, where their amorous affairs are tracked.'
TheAnna Nicole Show, the now-defunct The Real Roseanne
Show, and The Osbournes showcase the daily lives of
foulmouthed celebrities and their families and friends. 0 The
Joe Schmo Show satirizes the reality genre: a would-be
contestant believes he is participating in a reality television
show; however, all of the other "contestants" are actors, the
competitions are rigged, and much of the activity is scripted.''
A reality television staple, The RealWorld, tells the "true story
of seven strangers picked to live in a house and have their
lives taped, to find out what happens when people stop being
polite and start getting real." 2 The reality television machine
has already produced spin-offs:the RealWorld/Road Rules Battle
of the Seasons and the Real World/Road Rules Battle of the
Sexes, feature former reality television "stars" competing in
physical and mental challenges, while American Juniors and
America's Most Talented Seniors provide aspiring singers the
opportunity to become the next Ruben Studdard or Clay
Aiken (of American Idol fame), albeit in a different
demographic. 3 Additionally, the eighth installment of Survivor,
promoted as an All-Star version, will feature the winners
and other contestants from former seasons. 4
Although some television executives are attempting
to distance themselves from reality television, this
phenomenon shows no signs of slowing down." Each day
CBS and The WB receive a minimum of five reality-show
pitches, Fox and ABC receive ten, and NBC hears fifteen by
phone, as well as numerous others from employees of its
parent General Electric.' 6 The reality television machine has
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proved lucrative for television stations: Fox clocked its largest
audience share ever during Joe Millionaire's finale, averaging
34.6 million viewers for the two-hour program, including
26.2 million 18-to-49-year-olds, and 40 million viewers during
the final hour of the show.'7 These staggering numbers were
larger than every sitcom or drama since the finale of Seinfeld
in May 1998 and broke a night-long Fox ratings record set
four weeks prior by the season premiere of American Idol. 8
Even more notably, this ratings coup resulted in the first
February sweeps victory for Fox among viewers aged 18 to
49 in the history of the network.'9 Fox saw similar success
in the May ratings sweep competition, as over 38 million
viewers tuned in for the season finale of American Idol, making
it the second-most popular entertainment show on television
in 2003.20 NBC earned the highest 18-to-49-year-old
demographic rating of the summer with its finale of For Love
or Money, peaking at 7. I million viewers.2 All told, seven of
the top ten programs of the 2002-2003 television season
were reality programs. 22 Not surprisingly, premium cable
channels are embracing the craze: USA touts Nashville Star,
Bravo is home to The It Factor, Boy Meets Boy, and Queer Eye
for the Straight Guy, E! Entertainment broadcasts The Michael
Essany Show, andTLC produces Trading Spaces and A Wedding
Story.23 MTV's fall line-up alone contains eight new reality
programs, including Sorority Life, Fraternity Life, and Newlyweds:
Nick andJessica.24
As these programs continue to saturate the
primetime schedule, a new class of celebrities has emerged.
Many of these individuals have learned that the cost of their
instant fame is the loss of their privacy. Tabloid and reputable
publications alike have printed stories about embarrassing
and private incidents in the lives of reality television
participants.2 1 While few reality television stars have taken
legal action, it seems inevitable that many will in the future.26
The current law is unclear as to how such individuals should
be treated. Although they have not attained fame in a
traditional manner, reality television participants are certainly
not private figures. However, it seems unlikely that many, if
any, of these individuals will parlay their stint as reality
television participants into careers in the entertainment
industry. Thus, they should not be grouped into the same
category as actors, musicians, and other public figures. Reality
television participants deserve a class all their own.
If the media continues along its current trajectory,
the privacy rights of all individuals could be in jeopardy. As
reality television grows rampant, so does the likelihood of
any private individual having ties to a reality television
participant; consequently, such private individuals might be
subject to media scrutiny. This trend could be alleviated by
differentiating reality television participants from general-
purpose public figures. Accordingly, this Note aims to protect
reality television participants from the tort of the public
disclosure of private facts via two avenues: (I) the
establishment of a class of limited-purpose public figures
within the law of privacy; and (2) the placement of reality
television participants in this new category.
This Note begins with an overview of the basic facets
of privacy law, focusing on the tort of the public disclosure
of private facts and its interaction with the FirstAmendment.
Next, this Note explores the differences in rules for public,
private, and involuntary public figures. The law of defamation
is offered as a model for privacy law to emulate, specifically,
the limited-purpose public figure created under Gertz and
its progeny.27 Then, the issue of whether one's status as a
public figure may diminish over the passage of time is
considered. This Note posits that limited-purpose public
figures should exist in the realm of privacy law, and that reality
television participants are appropriate for membership in
this class. The ramifications of this categorization are
discussed through the lens of both privacy law and defamation.
Finally, this Note proposes a test for determining when
former reality television participants might regain their status
as private figures.
A. What is Privacy?
The word "privacy" has taken on so many different
meanings and connotations in so many different legal and
social contexts that it has largely ceased to convey any single
coherent concept.28 The Supreme Court has broadly defined
privacy as "the individual's control of information concerning
his or her person," that is, the right to control the
dissemination of information about oneself.9 The Court also
noted that at common law, the extent of protection of privacy
was related to the "degree of dissemination of the allegedly
private fact and the extent to which the passage of time
rendered it private. '"3 When most people hear the word
"privacy," they intuitively think of a situation that fits within
the category of law labeled as the tort of invasion of privacy
by the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.
3
1
r~i ate Fa Tort
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' law review article
of 1890 is widely regarded as one of the most influential
pieces of writing in American legal history.32 In the article,
Warren and Brandeis argue that the common law should
recognize a "right to privacy" which they view as a right
preventing truthful but intrusive and embarrassing disclosures
by the press.33 This "right to be let alone," which has emerged
as the general rationale behind the private facts tort, has
since been recognized by a majority of American
jurisdictions.34
Some courts have acknowledged the difficulty in
creating a consistent definition of privacy. For example, the
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Sixth Circuit has noted that "[t]he term 'right of privacy' is
imprecise, because this beguiling expression has been used
to designate many different rights of varying importance,
from the Fourth Amendment freedom from arbitrary
searches and seizures ... to the right not to have one's name
bruited about in gossip columns.'"35 The Supreme Court has
interpreted privacy to mean a bundle of constitutional rights
against governmental intrusion.36 Such constitutional
"privacy" protects against: (I) governmental intrusion into a
person's mind and thought processes and the related right
to control information about oneself;37 (2) governmental
intrusion into an individual's personal space, for example,
unreasonable search and seizure into a person's zone of
private seclusion;38 and (3) governmental intrusion into a
person's right to make certain personal decisions.3 9
The more familiar interpretation of privacy is the
right protected through the civil law of torts. The tort of
invasion of privacy differs from Constitutional privacy in two
important ways: (I) the types of acts which constitute an
invasion of "privacy;" and (2) while constitutional "privacy"
protects against governmental intrusion, the tort law of
privacy primarily protects against invasion by private parties.40
Dean William L. Prosser attempted to codify the
emerging tort of invasion of privacy in his influential 1960
law review article.4' He divided the tort of invasion of privacy
into four separate and discrete categories: (I) intrusion; (2)
disclosure; (3) false light; and (4) appropriation. 42 In Prosser's
view, in order to recover under disclosure, or the private
facts tort, the disclosure had to be public,the facts had to be
private, and the matter had to be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.43 Additionally, the private facts tort
required that the publication be truthfu.4 4 Prosser recognized
that this private facts tort was bounded by the publishing of
newsworthy events, which included current news,
information, education, entertainment and amusement, as well
as a logical connection to the plaintiff.
4
The Second Restatement of Torts codified Prosser's
four-part division of the invasion of privacy, identifying
Publicity Given to Private Life, or the private facts tort, as
one of its components.46 Under the Restatement, liability is
established for the publication of the private life of another,
provided (I) the publicized matter is highly offensive to a
reasonable person and (2) is not a matter of legitimate public
concern.47 The Restatement draws the line when publicity
ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is
entitled, and becomes no longer appropriate for public
concern, that is, when publicity transforms into an
unreasonable and sensational prying into private lives for its
own sake.48 However, this line is rather blurry, as courts
have since struggled in their attempts to strike a balance
between personal privacy and freedom of the press. Despite
the lack of clarity, the private facts tort is recognized in forty-
four states and the District of Columbia, and most
jurisdictions follow the elements outlined in the
Restatement.49
(2)The Private Facts Tot vs. the First
Amendment
The publication of private facts tort challenges the
First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.3 0 As a
result, courts must balance an individual's right to privacy
against the media's right to disseminate newsworthy
information."' This struggle is obvious
because one of the two main defenses
for the publication of private
information is newsworthiness.12 The
second defense, consent, is easily
recognized in situations where the
plaintiff knew of the contents of the
disclosure and agreed to its
publication. 3  Newsworthiness,
however, has been the root of much
debate, and courts have yet to agree
upon a uniform definition of this term.5
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The Supreme Court, in its limited
dealings with the private facts tort, has
expressly refused to address the issue by deciding the cases
without discussing the definition of newsworthiness.
The first constitutional challenge of the private facts
tort addressed by the Supreme Court was in Cox
Broadcasting Corp v. Cohn.:" The Court acknowledged the
need for the right to privacy but noted that the private facts
tort "most directly confronts the constitutional freedoms of
speech and press.' 6 Limiting its decision to the narrow issue
at bar, the Court held that a state may publish a rape victim's
identity obtained from judicial documents that are open to
public inspection, provided the information is accurate.5 7 By
failing to address the broader question of whether the
publication of truthful information could ever be punished,
the Cox decision merely reaffirmed that the private facts tort
addresses the disclosure of private, truthful facts.58
In Florida Star v. BJF, the Supreme Court invoked
the First Amendment to find no liability for a newspaper
who published the name of a rape victim received from a
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police department press release. 9 Although this decision
appeared to limit the reach of the private facts tort, the
Court expressly rejected the newspaper's broad claim that
the press could never be held liable for publishing the
truth. 0 Again, the Court failed to put forward a coherent
definition of newsworthiness, and merely expanded the
definition of newsworthiness by denying liability where the
information is provided by the government."
(3) Tests for the Newsworthiness
Defense
In order for private facts to be publicized, they must
be newsworthy in nature. As stated, the Supreme Court has
avoided taking steps to define newsworthiness, resulting in
various jurisdictions'creating their own unique meanings and
interpretations. Five tests for newsworthiness have emerged,
each falling somewhere on a continuum ranging from absolute
freedom of the press to complete censorship.
62
a. REJECTION OF THE PRIVATE FACTS
TORT
A few jurisdictions have chosen to not recognize
the public disclosure of private facts tort.63 By holding that
all true speech is protected, these jurisdictions impliedly hold
that all media communications are newsworthy and provide
true disclosures with greater First Amendment protection
than the United States Supreme Court requires.64 The benefit
of this outlook is its bright line approach,which creates judicial
certainty and eliminates the chore of analyzing whether
newsworthiness is present.6 The downside of this approach,




A somewhat less stringent test is the "leave it to the
press model" proposed by Diane Zimmerman in her famous
law review article.67 This approach, which allows the media
to have final say regarding newsworthiness, essentially holds
that "what is printed is by definition of legitimate public
interest' 68 Although this method recognizes the tort of public
disclosure of private information in theory, by allowing the
press to decide its own limits, the private facts tort loses all
strength in practice.69 The rationale behind this approach is
that the market will provide a check on the media because
consumers are opposed to yellow journalism. 70 However, the
success of tabloid journalism,"trashy" talk shows, and reality
television of modern day media provide persuasive evidence
that the press is unlikely to self-censor, as consumers are
increasingly infatuated by tawdry entertainment.
c. RESTATEMENT APPROACH
The Second Restatement sets forth the most widely
accepted test for newsworthiness. This test creates liability
when the publicized matter would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the
public.7' This standard was articulated by the Ninth Circuit
in irgil v. Time, Inc
"In determining what is a matter of legitimate public
interest, account must be taken of the customs and
conventions of the community; and in the last analysis
what is proper becomes a matter of community mores.
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to
be the giving of information to which the public is
entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying
into private lives for its own sake, with which a
reasonable member of the public, with decent
standards, would say that he had no concern."
72
In other words, newsworthy matters are those of
legitimate public concern and should be assessed based on
the locality's community mores.73 This approach adds the
element of decency to the analysis, barring the disclosure of
facts of legitimate public concern that are "so intimate and
unwarranted in view of the victim's position" so as to clash
with standards of morality.74 The disadvantage of this
outlook is that it may be difficult to apply, as its subjective
nature results in a sui generis analysis and potential
complications in varying jurisdictions. 7 Overall, however,
this method is rather positive because it attempts to balance
an individual's right to privacy with freedom of the press.
d. THE "NEXUS" APPROACH
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have employed a nexus
approach, which builds upon the tenets established in the
Restatement method. Like the Restatement, this test allows
for the disclosure of information that serves the public
interest but does not overstep the bounds of decency.
76
However, this approach adds a "nexus requirement," first
proposed in Campbell v. Seabury Press, which demands that
"a logical nexus (or relationship) exist between the
complaining individual and the matter of legitimate public
interest."" In Campbellthe former sister-in-law of a civil rights
leader sued the publisher of an autobiographythat disclosed
embarrassing private facts about her previous marriage.78
The Fifth Circuit found for the defendant publisher because
the facts of the plaintiff's marriage impacted the
autobiography's author, creating a logical relationship worthy
of Constitutional protection.79 The Tenth Circuit embraced
this method in Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., but defined
"nexus" as a "substantial relevance" rather than a "logical
relationship "80 The advantages and disadvantages of the nexus
test mirror those discussed in the Restatement approach
with some additional privacy protection (or media limitation)
as a result of the relevance requirement.
e. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH
The Supreme Court of California has created a
three-prong test for newsworthiness determined by: (I) the
social value of the published facts; (2) the extent of the
intrusion into private areas; and (3) the extent to which
the complaining party has voluntarily placed himself/herself
in the public eye."' Private facts are analyzed by these
components and are also held to the decency standard,where
decency is deemed absent once the plaintiff proves that the
defendant published the information with reckless disregard
for the truth.82 Like the Restatement, the California approach
attempts to balance privacy with the First Amendment.
The most recent study of the newsworthy standard
was in Shulman v Group W Productions, Inc.8 3 In declaring the
nationally syndicated broadcast of plaintiffs' treatment for
injuries resulting from a car crash to be newsworthy, the
California Supreme Court concluded that "a publication is
newsworthy if some reasonable members of the community
could entertain a legitimate interest in it."
84
The Shulman case is evidence that this test may be
in danger as California courts are embracing a more expansive
approach to newsworthiness and are displaying an affinity
for the nexus approach.8 However, regardless of this risk
of erosion, the California approach is intriguing because it
takes the public/private status of the complainant under
consideration.
B. Voluntary Public Figures
As established by case law, those who are famous,
notorious, or simply noteworthy lose some portion of their
privacy. Consequently, when public figures sue for invasion
of privacy under the common law tort, they must contend
with a lowered expectation of privacy.
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Two early cases that are often quoted have divergent
views of the public figure's relation to the private facts tort.
In Melvin v. Reid, the plaintiff was a former prostitute who
had been acquitted of murder.8
7
Subsequently, Ms. Melvin turned her
life around and lived respectably in
the private sector for many years
in a community that had no
knowledge of her lurid past.88
However, her tumultuous history
was revealed in a movie about the
murder case that used her actual
maiden name.89 The court held that
the creation of the movie violated
her right to privacy because she had
successfully reclaimed her private
figure status.90
Conversely, the Second
Circuit determined in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corpthat a reclusive
former child prodigy who had hidden from the media for
years was not a private figure.9' Mr. Sidis sued The New Yorker
magazine after he was featured and mocked in a "where is
he now" article, but the court held that his public figure
status had not diminished with the passing of time.92 The
Sidis decision stands for the premise that "at some point
the public interest in obtaining information becomes
dominant over the individual's desire for privacy"' 93
In Time v. Hill, a false light invasion of privacy case,
the Supreme Court cited Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., and
applied the newsworthiness defense. 4 Spahn, a New York
Court of Appeals decision, held that when a plaintiff is a
public personality, he is substantially without a right to privacy,
insofar as his professional career is involved.9" The Spahn
court warned, however, that the plaintiff maintained the right
to protect his personality from fictionalization and
exploitation in the form of an unauthorized biography.6 Taking
a cue from New York, the Supreme Court focused on the
"actual malice" standard and performed a defamation
analysis.
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Most jurisdictions agree there is a public interest
which attaches to people who by their accomplishments,
mode of living, professional standing or calling create a
legitimate and widespread attention to their activities.8 Those
who have achieved a marked reputation or notoriety by
appearing before the public, such as actors, actresses, and
professional athletes, should have a reasonable expectation
that their accomplishments and way of life will be the subject
of print, radio, or television attention.9 Such public figures
have to some extent lost the right to privacy, and they are
subject to fair comment and criticism by the media.1°°
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has noted that one of the public
interest privileges in reporting private facts is to report
truthful facts concerning public figures. 0'
Since judges typically emphasize the public's curiosity
in the material rather than the public's need for it, courts
are sometimes reluctant to apply the private facts tort to a
celebrity plaintiff.02 For example, in Ann-Margret v. High Society
Magazine, the Southern District Court of NewYork granted
the defendant magazine's motion for summary judgment after
it published a photograph of actress Ann-Margret partly
naked.'03 The court determined that the unauthorized
publication did not violate her privacy because the "use of
a person's name or picture in the context of an event within
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the 'orbit of public interest and scrutiny" [citation omitted]
a category into which most of the events involving a public
figure ... fall," does not lie within the ambit of the private
facts tort.04 The court broadly construed newsworthiness
and included "matters of entertainment and amusement,
concerning interesting phases of human activity in general"
ensuring that this instance of an unclad popular actress
would be deemed newsworthy.'0°
The Restatement holds that "one who voluntarily
places himself in the public eye, by engaging in public activities,
or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or activities
having general economic, cultural, social or similar public
interest, or by submitting himself or his work for public
judgment, cannot complain when he is given publicity that
he has sought, even though it may be unfavorable to him," 06
No right of privacy remains for the public figure in relation
to his public activities and appearances since these are no
longer private affairs.'07 However, while no cause of action
exists regarding revelations involving the public figure relating
to his famous status, liability may arise when the interest of
the public exceeds to the range of information that would
otherwise be considered private. 0 8 In fact, one California
court has held that public figures are entitled to keep some
information about their domestic activities and sexual
relations private. 09
C. volrutary Public Figures
For the purposes of the California newsworthiness
test, involuntary public figures are treated much like private
figures. In fact, the third prong of the newsworthiness test
asks the fact-finder to consider whether the plaintiff has
voluntarily placed himself in the public eye.,0 However, since
other jurisdictions treat involuntary public figures differently
than voluntary public figures, this class of plaintiffs warrants
a brief discussion.''
Involuntary public figures are persons who have not
sought public attention but who have become "news" as the
result of their involvement in or association with an otherwise
newsworthy event." 2 This category includes crime victims,
accident victims, accused criminals, and people who perform
heroic acts. '1 Additionally, those who are related to voluntary
public figures gain involuntary public figure status.
' 4
The Seventh Circuit opined that involuntary public
figures have no legal right to regain their private status as
long as the newsworthy events that made them public figures
remain in the public interest. s The court noted that even if
these "people who do not desire the limelight" would prefer
that their experiences remain private, they are not equipped
with the legal means to do so.1 6
In Leverton v Curtis Pub. CotheThird Circuit remarked
that the invasion of privacy rights of involuntary public
figures is not without limits. 17 The case concerned a young
girl who had been involved in a car accident at age ten and
had the misfortune of being photographed at that time." 8 At a
later date, another magazine published the picture from
the accident and the victim sued for invasion of privacy."9
Although ultimately finding for the publishers, the court
declared that the plaintiff's life may not be subjected to
continuous public scrutiny and would only risk attention in
situations closely related to the initial car accident.2 0
D. PIvate Fg re
While intuitively, private figures should have a greater
expectation of privacy than public figures, most jurisdictions
do not consider the status of the plaintiff in determining
newsworthiness.'2' The Supreme Court has stated, in dicta,
that the risk of exposure to public view is an "essential
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on
freedom of speech and of press," so even private citizens'
rights of privacy are difficult to protect.'22 Arguably, the
tendency of the courts to favor the press over individuals,
coupled with privacy-seeking people's reluctance to broadcast
their private facts in court, has prevented the full development
of the private facts tort.2 3
To this end, when the plaintiff in a private facts tort
is a private figure, the "right to be let alone" must still be
balanced against the public interest in the dissemination of
news and information, as well as the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech and of the press. 2 4 The right of privacy's
main objective is to protect private life, and it is determined
by a reasonable standard. 2 1 In other words, an allegedly
objectionable publication must offend an "ordinary man. '26
Applying this standard, rather than the standard for public
figures who arguably seek and enjoy publicity, assists the
protection of private citizens who desire to be left alone.'27
In addition to the apparent benefits to private figures' privacy,
this standard has the practical advantage of limiting the
amount of frivolous and extraneous information that the
press can report;that is, things done or said by public figures
are more likely to serve the public in an educational or
newsworthy way than those said or done by private figures.'
28
uIt. De(ala.[a (al
o Definition and Elements
Whereas the publication of private facts tort involves
the reporting of true, personal facts, the law of defamation
involves the reporting of false information about an individual.
Both facets of law often feature a plaintiff protecting his or
her image from a media defendant, highlighting the conflict
between individuals' rights and the freedom of the press.
The method of differentiating among private, limited-purpose,
and public figures is a model that may be adopted by the
private facts tort.
The individual's right to protect his own good name
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
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dignity and worth of every human being - a concept at the
root of any decent system of ordered liberty" '29 A state
"has a'strong and legitimate interest' in compensating private
persons" for injury to reputation by defamatory
statements. 30 Accordingly, in a claim for defamation, the court
presumes that the plaintiff is a private individual, subject to
the defendant's burden of proving that the plaintiff is a public
figure.'3 '
The elements required to create liability for
defamation are: (I) "a false and defamatory statement
concerning another;" (2) "an unprivileged publication to a
third party;" (3) "fault amounting at least to negligence on
the part of the publisher;" and (4) "either actionability of
the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence
of special harm caused by publication'
32
Although neither the Restatement nor the Supreme
Court has sufficiently defined public figures or private figures,
they have recognized that these categories are entitled to
differing sets of rules regarding defamation. 33 Liability is
created when one "publishes a false and defamatory
communication concerning a public official or public figure
in regard to his conduct, fitness or role in that capacity" if
the publisher: (I) "knows that the statement is false and that
it defames the other person' or (2) "acts in reckless disregard
of these matters." 3 4 Alternatively, "one who publishes a false
and defamatory communication concerning a private person
... is subject to liability ... if he: (I) knows that the statement
is false and that it defames the other, (2) acts in reckless
disregard of [the truth], or (3) acts negligently in failing to
ascertain [the truth]."'35 This stricter standard is also
applicable to public officials or public figures when the alleged
defamatory conduct involves the dissemination of information
in a purely private matter not affecting their conduct, fitness
or role in their public capacity.
36
B. History
Prior to 1964, the law of defamation was primarily
left to state law, as defamation was not protected by the
auspices of the FirstAmendment.117 The common law strongly
favored the State's interest in preventing and redressing
injuries over potential damage to individuals' reputations.3 8
(l) New York Tmes v. Sullivan
Defamation and Public Officials
In the landmark New York Times v. Sullivan decision,
the Supreme Court broke with the common-law tradition
and extended First Amendment coverage to defamation
concerning the conduct of public officials.'39 The Court held
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct absent proof that the statement
was made with "actual malice: " 40
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, said that
"where the plaintiff is a public official, his place in the
governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support a
finding that his reputation has been affected by statements
that reflect upon the agency of which he is in charge"
' 4
1
The Court went on to define "actual malice" as the
possession of prior knowledge that the allegedly defamatory
statement was false or the display of reckless disregard for
the truth.42 This actual malice must be demonstrated with
convincing clarity, that is, by clear and convincing proof.43
(2) Butts and Walker
Defamation and Public Officials
In the companion cases of Curds Publishing Co. v Butts
and Associated Press v Walker, the Supreme Court extended
the constitutional protection guaranteed by NewYork Times
to public figures. 44 The Court understood public figures to
be persons who, "by reason of their fame, shape events in
areas of concern to society at large" or nonpublic persons
who "are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution
of important public questions.'' 4 Later, the Ninth Circuit
offered public figures as "those persons who, though not
public officials, are involved in issues which the public has a
justified and important interest.'' 46 The numerous types of
people who may be viewed as public figures "include artists,
athletes, business people, dilettantes, [and] anyone who is
famous or infamous because of who he is or what he has
done. '
47
(3) Rosenblum - Defamation and
Public Issues
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., a plurality of the
Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard to
private persons, providing the statements concerned all
"matters of public or general concern" or interest. 48
However, this public/private issue distinction was patently
rejected in later Supreme Court decisions in favor of the
public/private actor distinction that had been advanced in
Gertz v. Welch, Inc. 49
(4)Gertz - Defamation and
Limited-Purpose Public Figures
In Gertz, the Supreme Court focused on the private
or public status of the plaintiff as the determinative factor in
calculating the extent of protection, and determined that
the actual malice standard still governed for public officials
and public figures, but not for private figures.50 Recognizing
that the public/private dichotomy was insufficient, the Court
divided public figures and public officials into three categories:
"(I) 'involuntary public figures,' who become public figures
through no purposeful action of their own; (2) 'all-purpose
public figures; who achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety
that they become public figures for all purposes and in all
contexts; and (3) 'limited-purpose public figures,' who
voluntarily inject themselves into a particular public
controversy and thereby become public figures for a limited
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range of issues.'"'" Further, the Court noted that private
individuals deserve substantially more rights; consequently,
the Court eliminated the need to overcome the "actual
malice" burden.
The Court












greater access to the channels of effective communication
and can consequently counteract false statements more easily
than private individuals can.5 2 As a result, the state interest
in protecting private individuals is greater because they are
more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public
figures.I 3 Second, an individual who voluntarily thrusts himself
into the public arena, in the manner that public officials and
public figures do, must accept the necessary consequences
resulting from involvement in public affairs.1
4
The categories of public figures and public officials
are comprised of those individuals who obtain notorious
achievements or who vigorously and successfully seek the
public's attention, as well as those who hold governmental
office. '5 The Gertz court noted that,"in some instances an
individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that
he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts"' 6 Such individuals are recognized as all-purpose
public figures and are required to meet the "actual malice"
burden established in NewYork Times.
Recognizing that without clear evidence of general
fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive
involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not
be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life, the
court identified another, more common type of public
figure.5 7 The limited-purpose public figure is an individual
who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for
a limited range of issues."' S8 These limited-purpose public
figures, who "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved," are held to the NewYork Times standard,
provided they fulfill the "public figure" requirements
previously discussed.5 9 Whether a defamation plaintiff is a
limited-purpose public figure is an issue of law.'
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The Gertzcourt, however, declined to expand the protection
afforded by that standard to defamation actions brought by
private individuals. 6' The Court reached this conclusion
following application of their two-prong test: (I) public figures
and officials are less vulnerable to injury from defamation
because of their ability to self-help; and (2) public figures and
officials are less deserving of protection because of their
voluntary exposure
to the increased








they are also more
deserving of
recovery."' 63 Based
on this distinction, the Court granted the communications
media the privilege to "act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves
to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood
concerning them."' 64 The Court also determined that "states
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability
for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood
injurious to a private individual."'65
(5) Application of Gertz os Anybody a
Lim;tedoPurpose PA bIc Figure?
Although the Gertz court went to great lengths to
carve out a definition of limited-purpose public figures, and
multiple Courts of Appeals have categorized plaintiffs as
limited-purpose public figures, the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to label anyone a limited-purpose public figure.'66
There have been three Supreme Court cases since Gertz in
which the defendants attempted to categorize the plaintiffs
as limited-purpose public figures; however, the Court
determined that these plaintiffs were private individuals in
all three occasions.
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In Gertz, the Supreme Court did not provide "a
detailed chart of the contours of the public and private figure
categories;" rather, it "elect[ed] to paint with a broad brush
[in lieu of] a case by case approach." 168 Subsequently, the
Court has developed a two-prong inquiry to determine
whether an individual is a limited-purpose public figure. 69
The test asks (I) whether there "was a particular 'public
controversy' that gave rise to the alleged defamation" and
(2) "whether the nature and extent of the plaintiff's
participation in that particular controversy [was] sufficient
to justify 'public figure' status.'
170
a. THE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY
Although the Supreme Court has not announced
an explicit definition of "public controversy," the D.C. Circuit
offered:
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a public controversy is not simply a matter of interest
to the public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome
of which affects the general public or some segment
of it in an appreciable way. A public controversy is a
dispute that in fact has received public attention
because its ramifications will be felt by persons who
are not direct participants.7'
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Supreme Court decided
that mere newsworthiness is insufficient to justify application
of the demanding"actual malice" burden of NewYork Times. 72
In Firestone, the wife of a descendant of "one of America's
wealthier industrial families sued her husband for divorce
"' 7
The charges and countercharges in the suit were sensational
and the press displayed a great deal of interest in the
proceedings.'74 The Court found "that although the divorce
proceedings were a matter of public record and public
interest, they were not a public controversy."'' 7 Further, the
Court decided that Ms. Firestone was neither an all-purpose
nor a limited-purpose public figure because she "did not
assume any role of especial prominence
in the affairs of society," and she did not
"thrust herself to the forefront of any
particular public controversy in order ff
to influence the resolution of the issues
involved in it. '1 76 "Ms. Firestone's resort
to the judicial process to arrange her
marital affairs was, for all practical
purposes, involuntary," and the a o
controversy over her marriage and
divorce, if one existed, was private. 77 In
refusing to "equate 'public controversy'
with all controversies of interest to the
public" the Court determined that"news coverage of a'cause
celebre' was insufficient to create a public controversy"' 78
Thus,"[t]he newsworthiness of an event is not the measuring
stick for identifying public controversy."' 71 "Nor is a
voyeuristic interest in someone's private affairs an appropriate
substitute."80
Likewise, the Court found in Wolston v Reader's Digest
Association, Inc., that the petitioner was not a limited-purpose
public figure because he was dragged unwillingly into a
controversy.8' The petitioner, Ilya Wolston, was the nephew
of two admitted Russian spies. 8 2 The respondent published a
book in 1974 entitled KGB, which included Mr.Wolston's name
on a list of Soviet agents, even though he had never been
indicted for espionage.'83 In 1958, Mr.Wolston had been
interviewed several times by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and also served as a witness in trials pursuant to
grand jury subpoenas. 8 4 However, Mr. Wolston failed to
respond to one jury subpoena because of his pressing mental
health problems, and his absence garnered media attention.85
The Court found that even though Mr.Wolston knew there
was a possibility that his absence might attract media
attention, his decision not to appear before the grand jury
was simply not persuasive enough evidence to convert him
into a public figure.1
86
The Fourth Circuit adopted this reasoning in Wells
v. Liddy, when it determined that a secretary employed in
the office of the Democratic National Committee during
the time of theWatergate break-in was not a limited-purpose
public figure.'87 The facts stipulated that Ms.Wells' only media
contact over the course of twenty-seven years since
Watergate was a handful of interviews, and each one was in
response to inquiries from reporters requesting her eye-
witness account. 8 Applying Firestone, the Fourth Circuit
declared that "voluntary discussion of events with the press
does not per se indicate that a defamation plaintiff has 'thrust
herself to the forefront of a public controversy."" '89 The
court also suggested that an individual who has had contact
with the press may be properly seen as a limited-purpose
public figure when he "attempts to influence the merits of a
controversy," "draws attention to himself in order to invite
public comment," or "invites that degree of public attention
and comment essential to meet the public figure level"' 90
Since Ms. Wells failed to act in a manner that would satisfy
any of these three factors, she was deemed a private figure.' 9'
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the Supreme Court held
that a research scientist who received federal funding was a
private figure, not a limited-purpose public figure. 92 As the
respondents did not identify a particular controversy and
merely pointed to concern about general public expenditures,
the Court found that there was no public controversy with
which to treat Mr. Hutchinson as a public figure.'93 Additionally,
the nature and extent of Mr. Hutchinson's involvement in
the issue of federal expenditures, namely, applying for federal
grants and publishing articles in professional journals, was
unconvincing to transform him into a public figure. 94 Finally,
Mr. Hutchinson's limited access to the media, in the form of
responding to the allegedly libelous statements, did not
provide the foundation to establish him as a public figure. 95
Thus, a dispute is not transferred into a public
controversy just because it is litigated and that litigation
acquires some news coverage. 196 Similarly, private individuals
are not transformed into public figures, limited or otherwise,
simply by virtue of their being drawn into a courtroom or
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by becoming involved or associated with a matter that
attracts public attention.197
b. NATURE AND EXTENT OF
PARTICIPATION
In determining whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose
public figure, a court must also focus on the "nature and
extent of an individual's participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation."'98 This
requirement speaks to the intended and actual participation
of an individual in a controversy. In general, to be a limited-
purpose public figure, a plaintiff must voluntarily cast himself
into the vortex of a dispute. ,99 This allows a person who is
not a public official or a general public figure to become a
limited public figure.' ° In other words, a plaintiff must actively
participate in a public issue in a manner intended to obtain
attention in order to be seen as a limited-purpose public
figure. 20' Therefore, a person who has been publicly accused
of committing a crime cannot be deemed a limited-purpose
public figure merely because he or she makes reasonable
public replies to those accusations.202 Voluntariness is a crucial
component because it creates the notion of the assumption
of risk and the consequent fairness in labeling the person a
public figure. 203
Additionally, courts have classified some people as
limited-purpose public figures because of their "status,
position, or association' 20 4 "If a position itself is so prominent
that its occupant unavoidably enters the limelight, then a
person who voluntarily assumes such a position may be
presumed to have accepted public figure status. '" 2 5 Even if a
person has no ideological thesis to promulgate, when that
person has chosen to engage in a position which draws him
regularly into regional and national attention and leads to
"fame and notoriety in the community," he may properly be
regarded as a limited-purpose public figure, and he invites
general public discussion.206 For example, in Chuy v Philadelphia
Eagles Football Club, Pennsylvania's Eastern District Court
found a professional football player to be a public figure
because of the American public's fascination with professional
sports.207 While conceding that the public's interest in
professional football is
not "important to the
commonwealth or to
the operation of a
democratic society in
the same sense as are
political and
ideological matters,"
the court decided that
professional football
was nonetheless an
important aspect of the fabric of American society0 8 Thus,
as one who voluntarily entered a "particular sphere of
activity" to which society has chosen to direct massive public
attention, Mr. Chuy, by extension, invited such attention and
was thus classified as a limited-purpose public figure. 209
These varying schools of thought have been
somewhat codified by the Fourth Circuit, which enumerated
five factors necessary to establish an individual as a limited-
purpose public figure. 210 These requirements, first presented
in Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., are: "(I) the plaintiff
has access to channels of effective communication; (2) the
plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in
a public controversy; (3) the plaintiff sought to influence the
resolution or outcome of the controversy; (4) the
controversy existed prior to the publication of the
defamatory statements; and (5) the plaintiff retained public
figure status at the time of the alleged defamation:'. "
The Seventh Circuit has accepted a"federal analysis,"
as proposed by Wisconsin courts, to determine who is a
limited-purpose public figure.2' 2 This federal analysis
"deemphasizes the voluntariness of the plaintiff's involvement
in the controversy and focuses on the plaintiff's role."2'3 The
three-part inquiry requires:"(I) isolating the controversy at
issue [and determining whether it was a controversy of
substantial statewide public interest affecting persons beyond
the immediate participants in dispute]; (2) examining the
plaintiff's role in the controversy to be sure that it is more
than trivial or tangential; and (3) determining if the alleged
defamation was germane to the plaintiff's participation in
the controversy."
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(6) Involuntary Public Figur
The Supreme Court first introduced the concept of
involuntary public figures in Gertz and has not mentioned it
since, save for a brief mention in a footnote in Firestone.
2
Although the Supreme Court has never identified an
individual who would properly fall into the involuntary public
figure category, there has been some discussion among the
circuit courts.21 6 The leading cases of Dameron v. Washington
Magazine, Inc. and Wells v. Liddy propose conflicting means of
finding an individual to be an involuntary public figure. 7
Whereas the D.C. Circuit stated in Dameron that people
can become public figures through sheer bad luck, the Fourth
Circuit in Wells
declared that there
must be evidence that
a person assumed the
risk of publicity in
order to transform




that injection into the
midst of a controversy need not be voluntary for an individual
to attain public-figure status 219 The court concluded that
the facts of the case created the rare situation acknowledged
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by the Supreme Court in Gertz in which an individual may
become a limited-purpose public figure involuntarily.20 Mr.
Dameron, an air-traffic controller who was on duty during
the Mt.Weather plane crash, was transformed into a limited-
purpose public figure for discussions of that crash.22' Mr.
Dameron was a central figure in the controversy over the
causes of the crash, thereby assuming a "special prominence
in the resolution of a public question' 222 Further, his name
and likeness were often used in numerous press reports
about the Mt. Weather crash.1
23
The facts of Dameron may be distinguished from
both Firestone and Woiston. In Dameron, the nature of the
trial and the controversy was significantly more serious
than the Firestone divorce, because Dameron dealt with
the administration of a governmental agency, the safety of
many Americans, and an extensive public investigation into
the events of the crash.224 Accordingly, Dameron was at
the center of a public controversy.225 In Wolston, the
petitioner's alleged defamation was in reference to his
tangential role in the investigation of Soviet espionage in
general, rather than his central role in refusing to testify
before a grand jury.226 Conversely, Mr. Dameron's alleged
defamation stemmed explicitly from the public controversy
in which he bore a central role.227 The Dameron court
thus concluded that, based on these specific facts, the
plaintiff was an involuntary public figure for the very limited-
purpose of discussion of the Mt. Weather crash.
228
The Fourth Circuit, fearing that Dameron had
returned to the Rosenbloom method of judging public figure
status in terms of the nature of the controversy, instead of
the plaintiff's role in the controversy, attempted to remedy
this perceived problem in the Wells decision.22 Returning to
Gertz for guidance, the Wells court proposed a test that
considered both the controversy and the plaintiff's role, but
placed more weight on the latter factor230 In order to be
deemed an involuntary public figure, a plaintiff must be a
''central figure" and the "regular focus of media reports"
involving a significant public controversy.23' The Wells court
defined a significant public controversy as one "that touches
upon serious issues relating to, for example, community
values, historical events, governmental or political activity,
arts, education, or public safety' 232 Additionally, the "allegedly
defamatory statement must have arisen in the course of
discourse regarding the controversy."233 Further, despite an
involuntary public figure's failure to actively seek out the
publicity of his views on the relevant controversy, he must
have, nonetheless, assumed the risk of publicity.3 In other
words, the plaintiff must have taken some action, or failed to
act when action was required, in such a way to make it
reasonably foreseeable that public interest would likely
attach.25 Finally, the controversy must have existed prior
to publication of the defamatory statement, and the plaintiff
must have retained his status as a public figure at the time
of the alleged defamation.
236
Thus, in certain defamation cases, plaintiffs may
correctly be categorized as public figures even if they do
not directly try or even want to attract the public's attention.231
These situations arise when a plaintiff's action may itself
invite comment and attention; consequently, the plaintiff is
deemed to have assumed the risk of such attention. 2138
A. Defamation: Limits on
"Limited-Purpose"
The Supreme Court has specifically and explicitly
declined to address whether or when an individual who was
once a public figure may lose that status by the passage of
time, and few circuits have addressed this issue." 9 Those
that have decided this question have concluded that the
passage of time does not alter an individual's status as a
limited-purpose public figure.
40
In Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., a case preceding New
York Times and Gertz, the Second Circuit held that a child
prodigy who was once a public figure remained a public figure
years later even though he had since "cloaked himself in
obscurity," because "his subsequent history, containing as it
did the answer to the question of whether or not he had
fulfilled his early promise, was still a matter of public
concern." 24 The Second Circuit affirmed its contention that
the passage of time will not necessarily change an individual's
status as a public figure in Meeropol v. Nizer.242 In Meeropol,
the court found that the children of Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg were general purpose public figures because they
were "cast into the limelight" during the Rosenberg trial.2 43
This public figure status was retained twenty years later upon
the publication of a book containing commentary on the
Rosenberg trial.24
More recently, in Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. New
York Times Co., the Second Circuit found that the appellant
priests and their mission were limited-purpose public figures
with respect to the religious controversy surrounding them
in the early 1970s.241 The priests voluntarily injected
themselves into the public controversy surrounding 1971
ordinations and had multiple and prolonged contacts with
the media.2 46 Further, the court found that the appellants'
public status had not diminished in twenty years (despite
the absence of media appearances since 1974) because of
Contemporary Mission's ongoing business activities and their
involvement in numerous lawsuits.24 7 The court conceded
that the first prong of the Gertz test might not be satisfied
because the priests' access to the media may have declined
somewhat over time.2 4 However, the second, more
important prong of Gertz was fulfilled, as the appellants
"voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
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from defamatory falsehood concerning them" by thrusting
themselves into the forefront of the religious
controversy. 4 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that
the appellants had maintained their public figure status5 0
In the Seventh Circuit decision of lilsap v.journal/
Sentinel, Inc., the court held that an individual who was once
a public figure with respect to a controversy remains a public
figure for later commentary on that controversy.2 ' The court
did not find merit in the plaintiff's arguments that he was
no longer a public figure because his involvement in public
controversy had ended about twenty-five years prior to
the newspaper column at issue and he had moved out of
the Milwaukee area.52 It held that a person who injects
himself into public controversy assumes the risk of negative
public comment on his role in the controversy, both
contemporaneously and into the future.253 In Mr. Milsap's
case, the risk included comment on his financial responsibility
during his time in the public eye, so his financial dealings at
that prior time were fair game for public discussion.24
In contrast, the First Circuit declared in Pendleton v.
City of Haverhill that "there may be a temporal dimension to
any limited-purpose public figure analysis.*233 Although
recognizant of the lack of case law in support of this
hypothesis, the court stated that "intuitively, one should not
become fair game for eternity merely by injecting oneself




In Wolston, the Supreme Court, after holding that
the petitioner was not a public figure, reserved judgment
regarding the conditions in which a once-public figure might
shed this status over time.257 However, Justice Blackmun
wrote in his concurrence that even if Mr.Wolston had attained
public-figure status in 1958, he had lost that distinction by
1974 when the allegedly defamatory book was published.
25
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Justice Blackmun proposed that the passage of time would
have substantial effects on whether an individual possessed
the characteristics required by public figures under the Gertz
two-prong test.2 9 As to the first prong, Justice Blackmun
noted that the passage of time between the controversy
and a "libelous utterance may diminish the defamed party's
access to the means of counterargument " 260 In terms of
the second prong, Justice Blackmun suggested that the time
lapse might "diminish the 'risk of public scrutiny' that a
putative public figure may fairly be said to have assumed."
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Thus, a one-time limited-purpose public figure may not be
dragged back into the public arena, particularly if he
intentionally avoids the public eye for a length of time.
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B. Privacy Law- Old News
Much of the litigation regarding the privacy rights of
former public figures is parallel to the defamation rights of
such personages.263 Some courts have held that once
individuals become public figures, they can never regain
the privacy they lost due to their status.2 4 Alternatively,
some courts have determined that the
subject of an article who was
newsworthy in the past may no longer
I tabe so after a period of time. 65
In the realm of privacy law,
newsworthiness is largely determined
'the by public interest, and this interest may
embrace matters that are not strictly
limited to current events .2 6 Thus, the
passage of time alone is insufficient to
eliminate the newsworthiness of an
item.2 67 Similarly, plaintiffs that were
made public figures by events that
occurred a considerable time ago may not regain their
private figure status merely by this time lapse. 68 Dean
Prosser recommended that "once a man has become a
public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate
recall to the public mind to the end of his days." 269 The
Restatement suggests that formerly public figures may regain
their public status if the previous activity attaches to a
currently newsworthy event.
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A significant lapse of time, however, is a factor to
consider in determining whether the publicity unreasonably
reveals facts about a former public figure who has attempted
to resume his private statuS.27' The final determination should
be reached after an analysis of community standards and
mores.
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The NewYork legislature has asserted that once an
item has been deemed newsworthy, it retains this status even
when it is no longer of current interest.273 However, New
York courts have reached a different conclusion when dealing
with involuntary public figures. 274 In explaining that public
figure status does not last throughout perpetuity, one court
stated,"when an ordinary citizen becomes newsworthy under
circumstances, either of calamity or honor, it is only for a
brief period of notoriety and for a reasonable length of time
thereafter that pictures, stories, and comments may be made
about him without his consent.
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California, too, has recognized the important
distinction between past figures and past acts. For example,
in terms of past crimes, courts are in agreement that reports
of the facts are newsworthy as they may prove educational
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and the public has a strong interest in enforcing the law.
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Conversely, the identification of the actor of long past crimes
serves little independent purpose, save for quenching the
curiosity of the masses.17 7 Once a crime has been long settled,
the identification of the offender is unlikely to assist in bringing
forth witnesses, gaining a sense of closure for the victims, or
performing the general administration of justice. 8
A. RealityTelevision Participants are
Limited-Purpose Public Figures
Reality television participants are not famous or
notorious enough to acquire the title of all-purpose figures.
However, they do not enjoy the same level of anonymity as
private figures. Although there is a subset of reality television
participants who may be correctly viewed as involuntary
public figures, such as those featured on shows like COPS,
these participants are such a minority that they are
insignificant to a discussion of the broader category of reality
show participants. Thus, reality television participants first
appear well-suited for the limited-purpose public figure
category by default. However, once analyzed under the law
of defamation, membership in this category becomes more
convincing.
B. Protection Against Defamation
Under the Foretich test, whether an individual is a
limited-purpose public figure depends upon (I) whether there
was a particular public controversy that gave rise to the
alleged defamation, and (2) whether the nature and extent
of the plaintiff's participation in that particular controversy
was sufficient to justify "public figure" status. 9
As previously discussed, a public controversy must
surpass the level of mere newsworthiness.8 At first glance,
a reality television participant is not transformed into a public
figure just by virtue of agreeing to join a show. Without the
presence of a public controversy, reality television participants
should be treated as private figures. However, reality
television arguably satisfies the criteria of a public controversy
because of the ongoing debate regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of the entire programming genre.28' Thus, just
by participating in reality television programming, an individual
may satisfy the first prong of the test for limited-purpose
public figure status.
Alternatively, some courts have suggested that one
who has contact with the press may be viewed as a limited-
purpose public figure if he draws attention to himself to
invite public comment, attracts enough public attention and
discussion to meet the public figure level, or attempts to
influence the merits of a controversy.2 82 Through this lens,
reality television participants certainly qualify for
membership as limited-purpose public figures: they draw
enough public attention by their presence on a television
show so as to invite public commentary.
Assuming arguendo that the ongoing debate about
the merits of reality television is a public controversy, whether
an individual reality television participant is a limited-purpose
public figure depends upon the nature and extent of her
participation in the controversy.283 If the public controversy
is equated with reality television as a whole, then the large
majority of participants would see the same fate, as the
"nature and extent of their participation" was largely the
same: they filled out an application, they signed a contract,
and they appeared on a reality television program. However,
the nature and extent should be determined based upon
the level of participation within an individual's program. For
example, the first contestant to be eliminated from the island
in the original Survivor was clearly not as involved in the
process as Richard Hatch, the eventual winner. Similarly, the
lovelorn contestants on The Bache/orwhose fates were early
rejections did not participate to the same extent as the actual
Bachelor, Alex Michel. The rationale for distinguishing among
participants on the same program becomes more lucid when
analyzed in terms of the five-prong Reuber test.
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First, the plaintiff must have access to channels of
effective communication. Someone as recognizable as Trista
Rehn, the Bachelorette, who made appearances on the talk
show circuit and at A-list events including the Superbowl
and the Golden Globes, obviously enjoys access to the media.
Conversely, many of the original twenty-five bachelors on
Ms. Rehn's show have disappeared from the public eye and
the public consciousness. It would most likely prove more
difficult for them to defend themselves via the media to the
same degree that Ms. Rehn could.
Second, the plaintiff must have voluntarily assumed
a role of special prominence in a public controversy. This
prong is satisfied by all reality television participants, though,
arguably, the "main character" of a dating reality show has a
"special prominence" as compared to other contestants.
Third, the plaintiff must have sought to influence the
resolution or outcome of the controversy. In the realm of
dating reality shows, this role is solely acquired by the main
character, and the other participants act in relation to him
or her. In the competition-driven shows, each of the
participants intends to influence the program's outcome by
emerging as the victor. However, in shows professing to
portray real life, participants merely hope to garner media
attention and do not wish to affect the outcome of the
program with any specific significance. The lack of intent
shown by the large majority of reality television participants
provides evidence that they do not rise to the level of
public figure required by the Reuber test.
Fourth, the controversy must have existed prior to
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the publication of defamatory statements. Here, reality
television has had a presence in America since the first Real
World eleven seasons ago, and the controversy has grown
pervasive within the past year. Therefore, all contemporary
reality television participants arguably fulfill this requirement.
Fifth, the plaintiff must have retained public figure
status at the time of the alleged defamation. As previously
discussed, courts are split as to whether public figure status
can be sustained over time. However, were any current or
recent reality television stars to be the focus of a defamation
suit, they would most likely be deemed public figures because
they remain in the public consciousness. It is clear that the
winner of the inaugural season of American Idol, Kelly Clarkson,
is far more memorable than a contestant eliminated at
auditions (unless they were particularly "dreadful"). Thus,
even though the show has ended, Ms. Clarkson remains a
public figure, while most of the 10,000 contestants should
be treated as private figures. The court would likely focus
upon public consciousness to determine whether each
individual person satisfies this prong of the Reuber test.
The Seventh Circuit's "federal analysis" test would
also suggest that the limited-purpose public figure status of
a reality television participant should be determined through
a sui generis approach. First, there must be a public
controversy. This has been established previously within the
Reuber analysis. Second, the plaintiff's role in the controversy
must be more than trivial or tangential. This prong reinforces
the hypothesis that minimal participants in reality
programming should be able to reclaim their private figure
status much more easily than the "famous" reality television
participants. Finally, the alleged defamation must be connected
to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy. Thus,
publications fabricating torrid love affairs about Married by
America contestants would pass this test, whereas those
same rumors regarding Star Search contestants might not
pass muster.
Thus, for the purpose of defamation suits, participants
in reality television shows should be treated as limited-
purpose public figures. In practice, this means these pseudo-
celebrities may only gain attention in relation to their status
as a reality television participant. Additionally, the extent of
public scrutiny these individuals may receive will be directly
correlated with the level of their involvement in their
individual reality program. As limited-purpose public figures,
reality television participants will be held to the "actual malice"
standard in defamation suits directly related to their
involvement in television; however, for all other allegations of
defamation, they shall be granted the same rights as private
individuals.
C. Protectior Against the tRivt
F% cTort
In most jurisdictions, one's status as a public or
private figure is of little importance in the private facts tort.
As the private/public status of a plaintiff is not expressly
listed as a means to determine newsworthiness, many
jurisdictions ignore this attribute altogether.285 However, the
California approach to determining newsworthiness should
be embraced, as one's characterization as a public or private
figure affects her expectations of privacy. Additionally, the
limited-purpose public figure should be recognized in
determining newsworthiness, as some classes of people, like
reality television participants, do not fall neatly within the
private or public figure category.
The Restatement acknowledges the private facts tort
when the information revealed (I) would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person and (2) is not
of legitimate concern to the public.86
Personal facts about public figures
typically need to be of a higher level
of offensiveness than personal facts
p about private figures in order to
satisfy the first prong, as public figures
lose much of their right to privacy.
S Reality television participants should
expect some invasion while they
enter the public eye; however, they
should enjoy normal expectations of
privacy as they become less of a public
concern. Thus, they should be treated as limited-purpose
public figures; that is, they can expect public scrutiny, only in
regards to their stint on television, for a reasonable length
of time.
In terms of the legitimate concern to the public, or
newsworthiness, the California three-prong test should be
employed. This test considers (I) the social value of the
published facts; (2) the extent of the intrusion into private
areas; and (3) the extent to which the complaining party has
voluntarily placed himself/herself in the public eye.28 This
newsworthiness test would provide a substantial level of
privacy protection without resulting in an unconstitutional
chilling of the First Amendment freedom of the press.
Protection from the disclosure of private facts is
pertinent because a number of reality television participants
have become the focus of media attention for activities not
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related to their television appearances. Legitimate and tabloid
publications are fraught with stories about the true lives of
reality television stars.2 In February, 2003 Alton Williams of
The RealWorldLasVegas was arrested and charged with assault
and resisting arrest after engaging in a bar fight in North
Carolina. 2 9 American Idol hopeful Frenchie Davis was
eliminated from the competition after the media discovered
she had once posed for a pornographic website. 20 Greg
Todtman, a suitor on The Bachelorette, was arrested for drug
possession at New York's JFK airport. 9 Rick Rockwell, the
title figure of Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire, had once
been under a restraining order sought by a former fiancee
who alleged that he hit her and threatened to kill her.292
Survivor's Brian Heidik had a soft-core porn background before
his $1 million victory in Thailand. 29 Ytossie Patterson and
Taheed Watson, a featured couple on Temptation Island, were
removed from the show because they already had a child in
violation of the show's rules.294 Denise Luna, a contestant on
Married ByAmerica, was found to be an ineligible bachelorette
because she was never divorced from her long separated
husband and was technically still married.2 91 Corey Clark was
eliminated from American /do/when Fox learned he had charges
pending for assault and resisting arrest 296 Rob Campos, the
leading man on For Love or Money, had been accused of
drunkenly groping a female officer during his stint in the U.S.
Marine Corps. 2 97 And Sarah Kozer, the first runner-up on Joe
Millionaire, was the subject of arguably the largest reality
television scandal. 8 What follows is an illustration of the
California test for newsworthiness as applied to Ms. Kozer's
predicament, illuminating the need for privacy protection of
reality television participants.
Fox's wildly popular program, Joe Millionaire, brought
twenty women to a chateau in France to meet the potential
man of their dreams, Evan Marriott.299 Although Mr. Marriott
was a construction worker who generated $19,000 annually,
the show's creators informed the women that he was a
multimillionaire, and Mr. Marriott agreed to go along with the
ruse.300 Each woman, drawn to Mr. Marriott's charming
personality, Adonis-like physique, and allegedly bulging wallet
attempted to win his heart and a series of bejeweled
baubles. 0' Mr. Marriott had the ability to dismiss his would-
be suitors at his whim. The Smoking Gun website broke a
scandalous story, which was summarily embraced by the
Associated Press and Reuters, about one of the three finalists,
Ms. Kozer10 2 Apparently, Ms. Kozer has performed under a
pseudonym as an actress in a number of bondage and fetish
films. The Smoking Gun posted numerous snapshots from
Ms. Kozer's extensive film career, a variety of publications
printed accounts of her experiences, and Ms. Kozer was left
to defend her fetish film past throughout the talk-show circuit,
weeks after Joe Millionaire ended its
lucrative run on Fox.
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Under the California test, the
revelations about Ms. Kozer might not be
deemed newsworthy. First, the social value
of the published facts appears minimal at
best. The public's interest in this information
stems mainly from its infatuation with sex
and scandals. Additionally, the most
reasonable purpose for revealing this
information seems to be to embarrass and
belittle Ms. Kozer.
The second prong of the
newsworthiness test, the extent of intrusion into private areas,
might prove problematic for Ms. Kozer because her films were
already in the public domain. Therefore, there is a strong case
to be made that Ms. Kozer's films did not constitute part of
her private life. However, Ms. Kozer used a pseudonym to
mask her true identity, implying that a certain degree of
investigation and intrusion must have occurred to link her
with her alias in the first place. Additionally, as discussed
previously, public figures may be entitled to keep information
regarding their sexual relations and domestic activities private.
If Ms. Kozer's films are interpreted as an expression of her
sexual proclivities, she might be justified in preventing them
from public distribution.
Third, one must consider the extent to which Ms.
Kozer has voluntarily placed herself in the public eye. While
she did take steps to join the cast of Joe Millionaire, most
courts would agree that her privacy is curbed only in relation
to that show and actions stemming from that show. For
example, it would seem that were Ms. Kozer to get married,
the public would have a legitimate interest because of the
"dating game" nature of Joe Millionaire. However, Ms. Kozer's
prior career choices and/or personal sexual predilections
would not be subject to public scrutiny, as they overstep the
boundaries of decency. It should be noted, however, that Fox
edited the show in a manner that emphasized an alleged sexual
relationship between Ms. Kozer and Mr. Marriott. Additionally,
as a finalist on Joe Millionaire, even without the videotape
scandal, Ms. Kozer enjoyed more publicity than many of her
fellow contestants. If one of the women eliminated in an
early round had made a videotape, she would arguably have
a higher expectation of privacy than Ms. Kozer.
Thus, depending on the court's discretion, and the weight
given to one prong over another, Ms. Kozer's past activities
may or may not be deemed newsworthy.
Alternatively, under the Restatement's approach to
newsworthiness, the level of offensiveness to a reasonable
person and the degree of legitimate public concern must be
analyzed. The latter component is coterminous with the
first prong of the California test. As to the offensiveness
prong, Ms. Kozer might not be insulted by the public becoming
aware of the fact that she made films. However, the risqu6
nature of the films arguably surpasses the level of
offensiveness that would be deemed acceptable to a
reasonable person. Thus, the exposure of such cinematic
activities may be seen as an invasion of Ms. Kozer's privacy.
Ms. Kozer took steps to separate herself from those films by
using a false name: at a minimum she would not want them
to receive the degree of public attention they attained.
Based on the negligible social value of Ms. Kozer's films and
the offensive nature of their content, her right to be
protected from the disclosure of private facts may have
been violated. Therefore, Ms. Kozer should be able to sue
for damages caused by the publication of this information.
Additionally, those similarly situated, i.e., reality television
participants in general, should be able to state a claim for
the public disclosure of private facts.
Do Protection After Lapse of Time
As discussed earlier, courts are split as to whether
public figures may ever shed their public status. As limited-
purpose public figures, reality television participants should
be able to regain their private figure personages over time.
When a former reality television participant is revisited by
public attention, he may avoid it if he is no longer a public
figure. A proposed test to determine whether he is a public
or private figure should consider (I) the nature and extent
of his participation in reality television; (2) the amount of
time he has been removed from the public limelight; (3) his
attempts to embrace or reject fame once his show concluded;
and (4) the relationship between the current controversy
and his prior notoriety. This test incorporates variations of
factors used to determine limited-purpose public figure status
in defamation law and newsworthiness in privacy law, as well
as the plaintiff's intent and activities once his fifteen minutes
of fame has elapsed.
As the reality television phenomenon continues its
exponential growth, the need to clarify and codify the status
and rights of reality television participants becomes significant.
With record numbers of reality programs on the horizon,
the potential for any member of the public to have contact
with a reality television participant grows likely; consequently,
it is possible that any member of the public's status as a
private individual could be jeopardized. This may be
particularly dangerous in the realm of privacy law, because
there is no recognized class of limited-purpose public figures.
In order to protect the privacy rights of all involved, privacy
law should acknowledge limited-purpose public figures, and
reality television participants should be deemed members
of this class.
Although limited-purpose public figures are the cause
of much confusion within the law of defamation, they act as
an important middle ground between all-purpose public
figures and private figures. Reality television participants
should be considered limited-purpose public figures;
therefore, they must overcome the actual malice standard
while they are in the public eye. Despite the court's tendency
to retain one's public status for perpetuity, limited-purpose
public figures, specifically reality television participants, should
be able to reclaim their private status eventually. The journey
from limited-purpose public figure to private figure should
be influenced by the circumstances surrounding one's stint
as a reality television participant, his subsequent interactions
with the media, and the time that has lapsed since his fifteen
minutes of fame expired.
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